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THE RELATIVELY WEAK ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF Canada's Atlantic pro-
vinces is a well-trodden scholarly terrain. It has also become a scene of some 
confusion, occupied as it is by scholars of different disciplines and differing 
ideological persuasions. The symptoms of regional disparity are readily visible: 
they include low per capita incomes, chronically high unemployment, relatively 
low levels of manufacturing output, and dependence on federal transfer 
payments. But even the description of regional disparity is no longer simple, and 
students of regionalism confront an array of terms — regional disparity, 
dependency, underdevelopment, uneven capitalist development, de-
industrialization — which are variously applied to the regional malaise. It has 
proved difficult to establish even a modest consensus about the origins of 
regional economic weakness in the Atlantic provinces. In the 1960s and 1970s 
historians did considerable damage to the old staples approach which stressed 
the obsolescence of industries based on "wood, wind and water", but it was 
easier to criticize the old framework than to build a new one. Upon this rocky 
ground have stepped those who assert the value of dependency theory in 
explaining regional underdevelopment. The dependency approach is more 
common among sociologists than among historians, but in the study of 
regionalism disciplines often meet in complementary ways, and the dependency 
approach merits very serious consideration by historians. 
In the 1970s many Canadian scholars began to read the Latin American 
dependency theorists, and they often began with Andre Gunder Frank.1 It is not 
surprising that Frank should have attracted attention, since he served as the link 
between Latin American scholarship and the English-speaking world, and he 
stated a new paradigm with such dogmatic force that it could not be ignored. 
Frank began by attacking those scholars who argued that "traditional" or feudal 
societies must shed political, social and cultural obstacles to development before 
they could "modernize", and that development must occur through the diffusion 
of technology, capital and other modernizing essentials from developed to 
underdeveloped countries. Frank shredded the modernization perspective, 
exposing its theoretical and empirical flaws. He asserted that the obstacles to 
development lay not within the underdeveloped countries at all, but within the 
international economic system. Latin American countries did not suffer from 
feudal or pre-capitalist constraints; it was their incorporation into the capitalist 
1 Andre Gunder Frank's books include Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New 
York, 1967); Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York, 1969); Lumpenbour-
geoisie - Lumpendevelopment: Dependence, Class and Politics in Latin America (New York, 
1972); Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (London, 1978); World Accumulation 
1492 -1789 (New York, 1978); Crisis in the Third World (New York, 1981). 
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world which had hindered development. The diffusion of capitalism led to a 
process of underdevelopment, in which capitalist metropolis expropriated the 
economic surplus of satellite countries: "it is this exploitative relation which in 
chain-like fashion extends the capitalist link between the capitalist world and 
national métropoles to the regional centres (part of whose surplus they 
appropriate), and from these to local centres". The metropolis "sucks capital out 
of the periphery" and dominates the periphery at all levels.2 Development and 
underdevelopment were not, therefore, at opposite ends of an evolutionary 
process; they were two sides of the same coin, part of the same historical 
process. 
Frank was not the most important theorist of dependency, nor even the 
pioneer of the approach. In fact, dependency was never a single theory of 
development and underdevelopment. It is difficult to arrive at a single definition 
to encompass the varying uses of the term "dependency", although many would 
agree with the definition of the Brazilian social scientist Dos Santos: "By 
dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is 
conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which 
the former is subjected".3 The dependency concept was used by nationalists, 
social democrats, neo-Marxists, and defenders of state capitalism in Brazil and 
elsewhere. Frank's formulation was quickly attacked and rejected even by other 
dependentistas. Despite an intellectual debt to such neo-Marxist scholars as 
Paul Baran, Frank and other dependency writers had departed from Marxist 
analysis in certain critical ways, and it is no surprise that Marxists offered the 
most penetrating critiques of early dependency approaches. Frank, for instance, 
had failed to define capitalism as a mode of production in the Marxist sense, but 
had equated capitalism with profit-motivated production for a substantial 
market.4 He defined both feudalism and capitalism as social systems with 
particular forms of economic exchange and distribution, and this emphasis on 
exchange relationships distracted his attention from the more basic relation-
ships which occurred within the sphere of production. It followed that his 
conception of the transition from feudalism to capitalism was weak or 
non-existent. His emphasis on a chain-like appropriation of surplus led to a 
simplistic notion that development in one area must occur at the expense of 
development in other areas. This argument flew in the face of evidence that 
2 Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment, pp. 7-8; Latin America: Underdevelopment or 
Revolution, pp. 227-8. 
3 Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence", American Economic Review, LX (May 
1970), p. 231. 
4 The mode of production refers to the total combination of forces and social relations of 
production which constitutes the economic structure of a productive system. Capitalism is a 
mode of production. Although not used in a single sense by Marx, the concept is rooted in 
statements in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. The relevant 
literature is vast, but a significant contribution by a Canadian is Gerald A. Cohen, Karl Marx's 
Theory of History: A Defence (Oxford, 1978). 
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capitalist development could and did occur in peripheral regions. And as more 
than one Marxist critic pointed out, Frank's emphasis on the transfer of 
economic surplus as the cause of underdevelopment ignored the likelihood that 
such transfers were merely a symptom of more basic relationships stemming 
from the coexistence of different modes of production in peripheral countries or 
regions.5 
Faced with these and other frontal assaults, dependency approaches became 
even more varied. Some students of economic development rejected the term 
altogether, while many others sought to incorporate the concept into existing 
Marxist and non-Marxist frameworks. Frank went on to study both the 
historical and contemporary dimensions of capital accumulation on a global 
scale. One of the problems in early dependency writing was the over-simplified 
distinction between a non-dependent centre and dependent peripheries. The 
"world systems" approaches of Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and others sought 
to avoid this problem by taking the capitalist world economy as one integrated 
system covering the globe, and analyzing the relations of power, exchange and 
accumulation within the system. Evolving in a very different direction was the 
Marxist analysis of productive systems and of the "articulation" of different 
modes of production within social formations. This approach avoids some of 
the problems in dependency writing by focussing upon the relationships between 
pre-capitalist and capitalist production within regions formerly defined as 
"dependent". Many other approaches followed in the wake of the dependency 
theory of the 1960s, and if there ever was a "dependency school" at all, it had 
dissolved by the late 1970s. 
This perilously brief summary is necessary in order to make a few points about 
Canadian dependency writing and its uses in understanding Atlantic Canada. 
First, trends in dependency writing in Canada are in some respects similar to 
those elsewhere. The same problems of logic and evidence which bedeviled early 
dependency writing about Latin America reappeared in Canada. By the 1980s 
there was no single dependency approach, and some of its former advocates 
appeared to be dropping the approach altogether. The result is not so much a 
5 Useful surveys of dependency theory and subsequent development theory include Ronald H. 
Chilcote, Theories of Development and Underdevelopment (Boulder, 1984); Magnus Blom-
strom and Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory in Transition (London, 1984); Ronaldo Munck, 
Politics and Dependency in the Third World: the Case of Latin America (London, 1984); Ronald 
H. Chilcote and Dale L. Johnson, Theories of Development: Mode of Production or 
Dependency? (London, 1983). For the Marxist critiques of dependency see Ernesto Laclau, 
"Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, no. 67 (May-June 1971), pp. 
19-38; Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian 
Marxism", New Left Review, no. 104 (July-August 1977), pp. 25-92; John G. Taylor, From 
Modernization to Modes of Production; A Critique of the Sociologies of Development and 
Underdevelopment (New York, 1979); Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment; A 
Marxist Analysis (London, 1975); Ronald H. Chilcote, Dependency and Marxism; Toward a 
Resolution of the Debate (Boulder, 1982); Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism 
(London, 1980). 
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theoretical vacuum as a confusion of approaches, whose relevance to the history 
of economic development (or underdevelopment) is often unclear. This is not, 
perhaps, an unhealthy impasse. Indeed the Canadian dependentistas demon-
strate how far Canadian scholarship has shed the parochialism which is often 
unfairly attributed to Canadian university intellectuals. Canadian sociologists 
in particular must be given the credit for bringing these trends in international 
scholarship to our attention, and for testing the dependency approach in the 
study of Canadian regionalism. 
Wallace Clement, for example, has moved from a rather uncritical acceptance 
of dependency theory to studies of particular regional resource industries, and in 
these studies dependency has very limited applications. In 1978 Clement was 
quoting Andre Gunder Frank and the Chilean economist Osvaldo Sunkel, and 
offering Frank's model almost as though it were a firm conclusion in the 
Canadian regional context: "A region can only be underdeveloped if it is tied to 
an external economy that is responsible for the underdevelopment.... The 
overdevelopment of one region depends on the underdevelopment of another".6 
Alas, the links in Frank's chain of exploitation were missing, and Clement did 
not pursue very far the evidence from the Maritimes which might have 
supported this sweeping assertion of dependency. Clement did show that the 
Canadian economic elite was disproportionately central Canadian by birth and 
residence, but this was hardly very surprising, and it was not clear how the 
existence of a central Canadian comprador bourgeoisie made "overdevelop-
ment" in central Canada responsible for "underdevelopment" in the Maritimes. 
As Clement himself knew, to turn the dependency models "into a theory of 
international and regional capitalism will require a great deal more empirical 
work".7 
It was hardly Clement's fault if the empirical work remained to be done, but 
his articles, and the earlier use of dependency theory by Bruce Archibald, raised as 
many questions as they answered.8 And there remained an unresolved ambiguity 
about the word "underdevelopment", just as there had been in earlier 
dependency writing outside Canada. Did development mean capitalist develop-
ment, or some idealized condition in which all exploitation was absent? For 
Clement, it seemed, development meant the absence of precisely those 
inequalities endemic to capitalism: "only when all those on site who participate 
in the development share equally in the surplus produced can it [the region] be 
6 Wallace Clement, "A Political Economy of Regionalism in Canada", in Daniel Glenday, Hubert 
Guindon and Allan Turowetz, Modernization and the Canadian State (Toronto, 1978), pp. 
99-100. 
7 Ibid., p.93. 
8 Bruce Archibald, "Atlantic Regional Underdevelopment and Socialism", in Laurier LaPierre, 
ed., Essays on the Left; Essays in Honour of T.C. Douglas (Toronto, 1971), pp. 103-20; "The 
Development of Underdevelopment in the Atlantic Provinces" (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie 
University, 1971). 
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truly developed".9 Yet, if we accept this, then development cannot mean 
capitalist development, and it follows that the United States is not a developed 
country, 
Even as the article cited above appeared, Clement was becoming interested in 
the boom and collapse of a regional industry, the fisheries. In the study which 
came from this work, The Struggle to Organize; Resistance in Canada's Fishery 
(Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1986) Clement avoids problems in the 
application of a dependency model, not by rejecting the model outright, but by 
subsuming the concept of dependency within the social relations of production 
in the fishery. Thus he perceives a "chain of dependence" which links fishers, 
processors, giant food conglomerates, and banks (p. 53), but the chain of 
dependence is" not the independent variable in his analysis. Dependence is 
instead a reflection of the more basic class dynamics within the industry: "Power 
relations themselves are based on class relations, and class relations underlie the 
organizational formation of the fishery" (p. 55). Clement does not tackle directly 
the issue of retarded capitalist development in particular regions. His book is an 
effort to understand the formation and behaviour of workers' organizations, 
and beyond that "the forces at work in Canada's class formation" (p. 7). 
Nevertheless, the book is an example of post-dependency approaches to the 
subject of regional development, and it contains clear implications for the study 
of regional economic development. Clement's study, and Peter Sinclair's 
analysis of the fisheries in northwest Newfoundland, remind us that small-scale 
capitalist producers and domestic commodity producers survive within the 
region, sometimes persisting and sometimes disappearing because of their 
interaction with such extra-regional forces as the large corporation or the 
state.10 These studies suggest that a simple dichotomy of developed core and 
underdeveloped periphery is untenable. The "disarray" and "crisis" in this 
regional industry cannot be understood in terms of inter-regional relationships 
of power and dependency, nor as a result of underdevelopment in the periphery, 
but as part of the particular nature of capitalist development in a major regional 
industry. 
Valuable as studies of single industries may be, it remains difficult to draw 
conclusions about the region as a whole from such studies. One of the more 
interesting attempts to integrate dependency theory with specific case studies 
was Ralph Matthews' The Creation of Regional Dependency (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1983). Matthews had already completed valuable 
empirical studies of resettlement in Newfoundland, of Smallwood's develop-
ment policies, and of development policies in Nova Scotia.11 In The Creation of 
9 Clement, "A Political Economy of Regionalism", p. 99. 
10 Peter R. Sinclair, From Traps to Draggers: Domestic Commodity Production in Northwest 
Newfoundland, 1850-1982 (St. John's, 1985). 
11 Ralph Matthews, "There's No Better Place Than Here": Social Change in Three Newfoundland 
Communities (Toronto, 1976); An Examination of Development and Dependency in Nova 
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Regional Dependency he made a bold effort to synthesize this work with 
dependency theory, and in so doing "to contribute to the development of a 
distinctive Canadian sociology" (p. 4). As the opening pages of the book make 
clear, the focus is not merely dependency but regional disparity and underdevel-
opment, and the causes of these phenomena. The subject is not simply responses 
to underdevelopment, but the process by which underdevelopment originates in 
the relations of dependency between regions. At the outset Matthews states a 
classic Frankian dependency approach: "Most societies are not naturally 
underdeveloped; they are made underdeveloped through their contact with the 
more developed ones. The same is true of underdeveloped regions within 
developed countries. Contacts with the more developed regions make them 
dependent and dependency leads almost invariably to underdevelopment" (p. 4). 
Matthews' case studies were valuable for the evidence they offered about the 
social consequences of myopic state planning. His studies also demonstrated 
that government's development policies were often part of the problem being 
addressed rather than part of the solution. Smallwood's development efforts, for 
instance, gave the province not only specific benefits but also "a legacy of 
underdevelopment" ($• 179)- Matthews had certainly said something about the 
entrenching of regional disparities. But his attempt to integrate his empirical 
work with dependency theory was neither very consistent nor very successful. If 
this is so, it is perhaps the fault of the dependency theory which he was seeking to 
apply. The simple formulation of dependency cited above, for instance, may be 
mere question-begging circularity. The statement says that underdeveloped 
regions become dependent on more developed regions and this causes them to be 
underdeveloped. The statement says nothing about the initial conditions of 
underdevelopment in particular regions. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, 
to test the proposition against evidence, since any evidence of poverty within an 
underdeveloped region would then be proof of dependence. 
Matthews was aware that such problems were associated with the Frankian 
dependency model. He knew that "as long as dependency theory concentrated 
primarily on processes of capital exchange" it had little to offer as a framework 
for analyzing regional disparities (p. 71). He knew also that the evidence about 
"capital exchange" between regions in Canada presented a difficulty for the 
dependency theorist. On the one hand there was "historical data documenting 
the movement of wealth from Canada's easternmost provinces in the period 
from 1890 to 1920" (p. 75). On the other hand there was plenty of evidence that 
central Canadian investors were moving into the Maritimes in the same period, 
purchasing industrial and other assets, and so moving capital into the region. 
How could dependency facilitate underdevelopment if it was also facilitating 
capitalist development? To resolve this problem Matthews cited the Brazilian 
Scotia (Regional and Urban Studies Centre, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1981); "The 
Smallwood Legacy: The Development of Underdevelopment in Newfoundland, 1949-1972", 
Journal of Canadian Studies, 13 (1979), pp. 89-108. 
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social scientist F.H. Cardoso, who answered precisely this dilemma by arguing 
that in specific situations dependency and development could co-exist.12 
Cardoso evolved the idea of "associated-dependent development", which held 
that "the interests of the foreign corporations" can become "compatible with the 
internal prosperity of the dependent countries" and can lead to "fairly rapid 
economic growth in at least some crucial sectors of the dependent country" (p. 
73). Matthews argued that these ideas are "particularly relevant to an analysis of 
regionalism in Canadian society" (p. 74). 
There are several problems with all of this. First, Cardoso's emphasis on 
dependent development could easily render the "dependency" concept superflu-
ous. If dependent countries may experience development as well as underdevel-
opment, what is the use of dependency as an explanatory variable? We should 
still need to know what were the causes of capitalist development in some 
regions and of underdevelopment in other regions. Furthermore, Matthews 
appears to have shifted his ground in order to accommodate Cardoso. Where at 
the outset his dependent variables are clearly underdevelopment and regional 
disparity, now he seeks to explain "dependent development" in hinterland 
regions, not underdevelopment. Dependent development is a situation in which 
"economic growth is highly constrained and determined by decisions made 
outside the region" (p. 74). This is very different from the conditions of 
underdevelopment and disparity which one hopes dependency theory might 
help to explain. 
There are other problems associated with Cardoso's approach which 
Matthews appears to have missed. Despite Cardoso's interest in the social 
structure of Brazil and the development of a Brazilian bourgeoisie, he was still 
preoccupied with the relationship between internal and external forces, and with 
relationships of exchange rather than production. Matthews shares the same 
preoccupation, and the result is a regional reformism which emphasizes external 
domination and external policies by which peripheral regions are "doomed" to 
underdevelopment (p. 117). Unfortunately Matthews also wishes to incorporate 
Marxist analyses of class and production, but Marxism is all too transparently 
recruited into the service of autonomist regionalism. "Dependency theory is 
built on the Marxist argument that capitalism can survive only through the 
exploitation and subjugation of other areas [my emphasis]" (p. 87). In the first 
stage of dependency analysis, says Matthews, the focus is "primarily on the 
nature of economic exchange" whereby underdeveloped regions are "drained of 
their resources and wealth", and this is also, apparently, "Marxist analysis". The 
stage of dependency analysis which deals with "social structures" and "the 
nature of social class" is apparently "beyond traditional Marxist analysis" (p. 
87). This is a misreading of both dependency theory and its connection to 
Marxist approaches. 
12 Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America 
(Berkeley, 1979). 
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Matthews, like many other dependency writers, shifts his focus from the 
relations between social classes to the relations between regions, without being 
able to link the two sets of relationships. Dependency did not offer him a theory 
capable of relating these two sets of relationships into a coherent explanation for 
regional development. Instead, dependency paid lip service to class analysis in 
the context of "a normative stand against external exploitation" (p. 76). It is no 
surprise that Matthews quotes Osvaldo Sunkel, who made clear that his purpose 
was "the assertion of the national interest of our countries": "The aim is greater 
autonomy, in order to achieve development without dependencia and without 
marginalization".13 Matthews' solutions to regional underdevelopment within 
Canada are very like Sunkel's quest for autonomy: "Presumably a more 
equitable distribution of economic power and industry in the country would be 
necessary as well as a reduction in the chains of dependency which link local 
entrepreneurs to investment capital outside the regions" (p. 76). More appropri-
ate development policies might help the peripheral society to "move from 
economic dependency to self-sufficiency" (p. 193). 
Matthews had offered a bold synthesis of dependency approaches and he had 
challenged others to apply the model. He knew that the validity of the model 
depended upon "an application of the theory in an empirical investigation of at 
least one region of the country" (p. 88). It is hardly Matthews' fault if the 
empirical studies have been slow to appear. For this failure Canadian sociology 
has recently earned a severe chastising, not from a historian, but from a 
sociologist. J.D. House's critique appears in Regionalism in Canada (Toronto, 
Irwin Publishing, 1986), a collection of essays edited by Robert J. Brym. House 
contends that in analyzing relations between the state and social class, especially 
in the regions, Canadian sociology and political economy have slipped into "a 
kind of mental laziness", using neo-Marxist concepts "to bludgeon their 
empirical material", and offering "pseudo-explanation" which lacks "the 
discipline of careful empirical investigation" (p. 183). House was perhaps unduly 
harsh, but he might well have discovered ammunition in the fate of dependency 
theory in this same collection of essays. In the opening essay Brym reviews 
dependency theory and offers some evidence about regional economic disparity, 
but elsewhere in the book dependency models are scarcely applied at all. In his 
conclusion to the book Ralph Matthews must repeat his earlier appeal that 
scholars "move beyond programmatic statements and theoretical critiques" and 
provide "detailed empirical knowledge" of the links between dependency and 
regionalism (p. 205). By 1986, it seems, we were still awaiting the grand synthesis 
of dependency theory and empirical evidence. 
Where the dependency theorist does apply his model to historical evidence, 
13 Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and 'Dependencia'", Foreign Affairs, 50 (April 1972), cited in 
Chilcote, Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, p. 30. David Alexander also quoted 
Sunkel in "Development and Dependence in Newfoundland, 1880-1970", Atlantic Canada and 
Confederation; Essays in Canadian Political Economy (Toronto, 1983), p. 24. 
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the results are often unimpressive. Robert Brym presents evidence on per capita 
incomes by region up to 1979 and on net provincial exchange of manufactured 
goods in 1967. The data, he says, "do seem to support in broad terms some of the 
major contentions of dependency theory" (p. 14). Unfortunately there is a simple 
logical problem here: the data presented merely prove that regional disparities 
exist, which we knew already. The data are not presented as part of "an 
explanation of regional economic disparities" (p. 7), which is what dependency 
theory purports to offer. Insofar as an historical argument about the conditions 
of disparity is being presented, the argument is tautological: dependency is a 
cause of regional disparities in manufacturing output and income levels; these 
same disparities prove that dependency is the cause. 
There is, of course, plenty of evidence to suggest that uneven development is a 
structural characteristic of the Canadian economy in the 20th century. But the 
historical explanation for this characteristic cannot rest upon evidence from the 
last half of the 20th century alone, or we run the risk of analyzing symptoms 
rather than causes. Historical explanation must also rest upon analysis of the 
evolution of regional economies in a longer time frame and upon evidence from 
the 19th as well as the 20th centuries. Dependency theorists are aware of this, 
and they do cite evidence to show that the economy of central Canada, as it 
developed between the 1880s and 1920s, influenced the economy of the 
Maritime provinces in adverse ways. In an article in Studies in Political 
Economy James Sacouman concludes that "analyses of capital accumulation in 
industrial areas of the region have demonstrated the role of the centralization 
and concentration of capital in the de-industrialization of the Maritimes during 
the early 20th century".14 Michael Clow quotes John F. Baker: "the concentra-
tion and centralization of both financial and productive units of capital in 
Montreal and Toronto, and the concomitant transition from individual 
competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism, conditioned the concurrent 
underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada and the development of Central 
Canada".15 
Once again historians are likely to put in a caveat as they read this. We know 
that industrial capital was undergoing consolidation and concentration in 
central Canada between the 1890s and the 1920s, and "this trend is not in dispute. 
The problem is that, if offered as historical explanation for underdevelopment in 
the Maritimes, the above statements appear to repeat the old "development of 
underdevelopment" formula and its question-begging tautology. Remember 
that industrialization in central Canada was further advanced in important 
14 R. James Sacouman, "The 'Peripheral' Maritimes and Canada-Wide Marxist Political 
Economy", Studies in Political Economy, no. 6 (Autumn 1981), pp. 139-40. 
15 Michael Clow, "Politics and Uneven Capitalist Development", Studies in Political Economy, no. 
14 (Summer 1984), p. 129, citing John F. Baker, "The Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada, 
1867-1920: A Study of the development of Capitalism" (M.A. thesis, McMaster University, 
1977). 
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respects than industrialization in the Maritimes when the two regions were 
joined in a political and commercial union. The growth of industrial capitalism 
in central Canada was a complex process which proceeded to a large extent 
independently of inputs drawn from the Maritimes. To the extent that this was 
so, the concentration and centralization of financial and industrial capital in 
central Canada did not cause or "condition" the relative absence of financial and 
industrial capital in the Maritimes. The centralization of capital in one region, in 
this case central Canada, means ipso facto the relative absence of capital in the 
other region. It remains to be explained why small and large units of capital were 
concentrated spatially in central Canada rather than in the Maritimes. 
Historians have written about capital markets in this period, but their 
evidence does not fit well with the notion of a reciprocal process of development 
in one region and underdevelopment in another. We simply do not have a 
satisfactory measure of the net flow of capital between regions. Nor has it been 
proved that there was a net flow of capital out of the Maritimes which was so 
large as to induce structural underdevelopment or de-industrialization. We 
know from the work of T.W. Acheson, Larry McCann and others that there was 
substantial investment by central Canadian business in the Maritimes.16 It is not 
clear that this investment was a cause of underdevelopment, unless the growth of 
branch plants is itself underdevelopment. Of course, central Canadian firms 
shut down many branch plants in the Maritimes, but local owners were also 
liquidating local industrial assets, and nobody has proved that regional 
capitalists, had they retained greater control, would have behaved differently 
from central Canadian capitalists. Indeed, as Larry McCann points out, "When 
the economy of the Maritimes went into serious decline in the 1920s, forcing a 
net loss of about 1,100 businesses, branch businesses managed to hold firm, and 
in so doing gained a greater share of all business activities".17 Although central 
Canadian capital facilitated underdevelopment by taking savings from the 
region, it also facilitated capitalist development by putting capital into the 
region. 
Integration of the Maritimes into the national capital market was very largely 
the work of financial institutions and investors within the region. As James 
Frost has shown, the largest banking institution in the region, the Bank of Nova 
Scotia, had no special hostility to industrial investments and it supported 
16 Christopher Armstrong, "Making a Market: Selling Securities in Atlantic Canada before World 
War I", Canadian Journal of Economics, XIII, 3 (Autumn 1980), pp. 438-54; Neil Quigley, "Bank 
Credit and the Structure of the Canadian Space Economy, 1890-1935" (Ph.D. thesis, University 
of Toronto, 1986); James D. Frost, "The 'Nationalization' of the Bank of Nova Scotia, 
1880-1910", Acadiensis, XII, 1 (Autumn 1982), pp. 3-38; T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy 
and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910", Acadiensis, 1,2 (Spring 1972), pp. 3-28; 
L.D. McCann, "Metropolitanism and Branch Businesses in the Maritimes, 1881-1931", in P.A. 
Buckner and David Frank, eds., Atlantic Canada After Confederation (Fredericton, 1985), pp. 
202-15. 
17 McCann, "Metropolitanism and Branch Businesses", p. 203. 
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industrial enterprises in the region. Frost, whose important article has been 
reprinted in David Frank's Industrialization and Underdevelopment in the 
Maritimes, 1880-1930 (Toronto, Garamond Press, 1985), also argued that from 
the late 1890s "enormous sums of money were drained away from the region", 
even before the bank had become a national institution and while its Directors 
were still Maritimers (p. 28). Integration of the region into the national capital 
market was also the work of such local institutions as Royal Securities of 
Halifax, F.B. McCurdy and Company of Halifax and Saint John, and other 
brokers. These agencies directed savings not only to central Canada but also to 
industries within the Maritimes as well as towards western Canada, the United 
States, and Latin America. The notion that the concentration of financial and 
industrial capital in Toronto and Montreal "conditioned" or caused the relative 
absence of such concentration in the Maritimes is either tautologous or it is 
misleading. It attributes to Toronto and Montreal capitalists a degree of power 
and domination over the mobilization and direction of savings in the Maritimes 
which they did not possess, and it distracts attention from the development of 
financial capital in the Maritimes. It would be as reasonable to argue that 
Maritime capital de-industrialized the region, as it is to argue that the concentration 
of capital in central Canada de-industrialized the region. Neither proposition is 
very helpful. If Maritimers engineered the dispersion of their own savings, and 
so contributed to de-industrialization, then something was occurring within the 
region, as well as beyond, to produce this result. Even when capital did flow 
from the region, this was not an obstacle to investment within the region, and 
there was no shortage of money for investment in the Maritimes. The cost of 
capital, as suggested by interest rates on bank loans, was much lower in Halifax 
than in Montreal in the late 1880s and early 1890s.18 In the first decade of the 
20th century the Halifax and Montreal rates converged, but one economic study 
of capital markets in this period argues strongly that the rise in the Halifax 
lending rate was not a consequence of inter-regional capital flows, but the result 
of a decline in the quality of loan applications.19 Once again the evidence points 
to some unexplored internal conditions of underdevelopment within the region. 
Dependency theory, by its emphasis on the centripetal forces of central Canadian 
capital, distracts attention from those prior conditions of underdevelopment. 
Dependency comprises much more than the control and extraction of a 
region's economic surplus, and other aspects of dependency and underdevelop-
ment have been examined in historical contexts. One of the most useful 
collections, combining the work of both historians and sociologists, is Robert 
Brym and James Sacouman's Underdevelopment and Social Movements in 
18 James D. Frost, "Principles of Interest: The Bank of Nova Scotia and the Industrialization of the 
Maritimes, 1880-1910" (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1978), Appendix C. 
19 N. Quigley, "Interest Rates and the Structure of the Bank Credit Market: Canada 1890-1934" 
(unpublished paper presented to the XVI Conference on the Use of Quantitative Methods in 
Canadian Economic History, Hamilton, 1987). 
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Atlantic Canada (Toronto, New Hogtown Press, 1979). There is no want of 
empirical evidence here, but the focus is on the social dimensions of underdevel-
opment rather than on the historical roots or conditions of underdevelopment. 
Gene Barrett's work on labour and workers' organizations in the Nova Scotia 
fisheries, for instance, is a valuable study of responses to "forms of underdevel-
opment" in a regional industry.20 Other chapters make little or no use of 
dependency theory. The socialist movements discussed by David Frank and 
Nolan Reilly were not responses to underdevelopment but to capitalist develop-
ment within the region. James Overton's essay on neo-nationalism in Newfound-
land suggests that the theoretical underpinnings of neo-nationalist ideology include 
dependency theory itself, which led at least one reviewer to conclude that 
Overton thereby incorporates a critique of the book itself.21 The discussions of 
underdevelopment by Brym, Sacouman and Veltmeyer do not transcend the 
problems inherent in the "development of underdevelopment" model.22 One 
difficulty results from the lack of consistency in defining the term "underdevel-
opment" (pp. 9-13, 17-32). At first sight the term appears to refer to a relatively 
slow transition to industrial capitalism in one region, a process facilitated by a 
more rapid transition in another region. Development, then, means a more 
rapid transition to industrial capitalism. Yet as soon as this definition appears, it 
evaporates. Underdevelopment, according to Veltmeyer, is the creation of an 
industrial reserve army of labour (p. 19). In other words, it is the creation of a 
capitalist labour market from which central Canada benefits. Once again the 
basic historical question is unanswered: why should the industrial reserve army 
be located in the Maritimes rather than elsewhere? But then the definition of 
underdevelopment broadens to include steel production in Cape Breton and the 
secondary sector of forest production. These are part of "the structure of 
underdevelopment" (p. 26), even though they are also capitalist development. 
From this point the definition broadens even further, until as James Bickerton has 
pointed out all forms of capital accumulation and labour process in the region 
appear to be either direct or indirect underdevelopment: "Indeed, it often appears 
that the mere presence of exploitation is here equated with underdevelopment".23 
If there is confusion over the meaning of words, it may be that this results from 
an inadvertant stretching of terms to fit the dependency mould. The term 
20 See also L. Gene Barrett, "Perspectives on Dependency and Underdevelopment in the Atlantic 
Region", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, XVII, 3 (1980), pp. 273-86 and 
"Capital and the State in Atlantic Canada: The Structural Context of Fishery Policy Between 
1939 and 1977", in Cynthia Lamson and Arthur J. Hanson, eds., Atlantic Fisheries and Coastal 
Communities (Halifax, 1984), pp. 77-131. 
21 James Bickerton, "Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada: A Critique", 
Studies in Political Economy, no. 9 (Fall 1982), p. 200. 
22 But see Henry Veltmeyer, "Dependency and Underdevelopment: Some Questions and Prob-
lems", Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 2, 2 (Spring-Summer 1978), pp. 
55-71. 
23 Bickerton, "Underdevelopment and Social Movements", p. 196. 
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"de-industrialization" might with justification be applied to the Maritimes in the 
1920s, and E.R. Forbes and David Frank have offered evidence of relative and 
absolute decline in industrial output.24 But the term, has been applied much more 
widely. Referring to the decades up to the 1920s, Michael Clow writes: "a 
concentration and centralization of capital in Montreal had produced a pattern 
of destruction and 'branch planting' of Maritime manufacturing which led to the 
de-industrialization of the region".25 Unfortunately the Maritimes was not being 
de-industrialized in the period to which Clow refers. Between 1880 and 1910 real 
output in manufacturing in the Maritimes grew at an average annual rate of 2.3 
percent. Between 1910 and 1939 manufacturing output grew by 1.3 percent a 
year. In both periods manufacturing output per capita also grew, although 
slowly. The 1920s was a particularly bad decade for industry in the Maritimes, 
but as David Alexander has shown, "In the badly depressed inter-war economy 
of the Maritimes, this slow growing manufacturing sector still accounted for 69 
percent of total output growth, which was almost the same as in Canada".26 The 
proportion of the Maritimes' labour force in manufacturing was higher in 1941 
or in 1951 than it had been in 1881 or 1901.27 What, then, is the meaning of 
"de-industrialization"? The misuse of this term follows not merely from an 
incomplete reading of secondary sources, but from the development/ 
underdevelopment model. The central condition of historical experience in the 
Maritimes must be the concentration and centralization of capital in Montreal; 
it follows, by reductionist logic, that a destruction of manufacturing must be 
occurring in the Maritimes. The fact that the Maritimes was undergoing its own 
particular transition to industrial capitalism, and that its manufacturing sector 
was growing, is not simply ignored — it is denied. 
In the wake of the dependency models it is necessary to specify what is on the 
agenda of the economic history of the region. There was, of course, a relatively 
slow transition to industrial capitalism in the Maritimes, compared to other 
regions and provinces, and this question remains critical. A separate question is 
the conditions which gave rise to the long-term structural problems of relatively 
low incomes and output per capita and chronically high unemployment. This is 
a separate question because it is a mistake to equate high incomes and low 
24 E.R. Forbes, Maritime Rights: The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927, A Study in 
Canadian Regionalism (Montreal, 1979); David Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry and the 
Rise and Fall of the British Empire Steel Corporation", Acadiensis, VII, 1 (Autumn 1977), 
pp. 3-34. 
25 Michael Clow, "Politics and Uneven Capitalist Development", p. 119 (emphasis is in the 
original). 
26 David Alexander, "Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region, 1880 to 1940", Acadiensis, VIII, 1 
(Autumn 1978), pp. 62,68. The weakest decade was the 1920s, when real manufacturing output 
grew at a mere 0.3 percent a year. 
27 Henry Veltmeyer, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada", in Brym and 
Sacouman, Underdevelopment and Social Movements, Table 1-9, p. 29; David Alexander, 
"Economic Growth in the Atlantic Region", p. 53. 
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unemployment with a relatively large manufacturing sector (it is worth 
remembering that when the Maritime provinces enjoyed relative prosperity in 
the third quarter of the 19th century they did so in part with a relatively large 
service and transportation sector). It would be silly to deny that industrial 
capitalism as it developed in central Canada and elsewhere influenced develop-
ment in the Maritimes. But to understand and define those influences, it is best 
to begin with the history of transformations within the regional economy which 
preceded Canadian influence, for these transformations set the conditions of 
subsequent interaction and gave rise to specific class interests which forged the 
connections of interdependent growth and change. This work must fall to 
historians, and it is our task to supply the empirical evidence against which 
post-dependency models may be tested. 
Even as some Marxist scholars outside Canada were discarding dependency 
in the study of third world economic development, at least one economic 
historian in Canada was also discarding A.G. Frank in favour of a more 
orthodox Marxist approach. Steven Antler's essay on underdevelopment in 
Newfoundland, in the collection by Brym and Sacouman, distilled parts of an 
important doctoral thesis which unfortunately remains unpublished.28 It is 
perhaps not surprising that a post-dependency approach should appear in 
Newfoundland. In this colony a relatively slow transition to industrial 
capitalism, as well as the other structural problems mentioned above, began in 
the 19th century, when the direct influence of central Canadian capital and even 
British capital was minimal. It was simply not possible to explain the relatively 
slow transition to industrial capitalism in Newfoundland by referring to the 
underdeveloping influences of external capital. Both Marxist and non-Marxist 
historians agree on one thing: the origins of Newfoundland's underdevelopment 
lie in the period from the middle of the 19th century to the early 20th century, and 
they lie in the marine sector of the economy, where a pre-capitalist mode of 
production persisted and the influence of external capital was minimal or 
indirect.29 
Antler begins not with dependency theory, nor with exchange relations 
emerging from the staple base, but with Marx, with modes of production, and 
with a model of exploitation on a colonial frontier. The model may be 
summarized as follows. The capture of surplus value normally requires 
ownership of the means of production, the purchase of labour power as a 
commodity, and the existence of a social class with nothing to sell but labour 
power. On a colonial frontier the first and third of these conditions are not fully 
met; there is a plentiful supply of land, there are many independent commodity 
28 Steven D. Antler, "Colonial Exploitation and Economic Stagnation in Nineteenth Century 
Newfoundland" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Connecticut, 1975). 
29 See, for instance, Shannon Ryan, Fish Out of Water; The Newfoundland Saltfish Trade 
1814-1914 (St. John's, 1986); Rosemary Ommer, "What's Wrong With Canadian Fish?", Journal 
of Canadian Studies, XX, 3 (Fall 1985), pp. 122-42. 
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producers, and wage labour is relatively scarce. Given a plentiful supply of land 
or resources, growth may occur simply through a continued increase in the 
number of independent small holdings. How then does capitalism reproduce 
itself on such a frontier? Colonial government and/ or merchant capital 
expropriate the small holders and restrict the ownership of land through high 
prices, licensing, or other methods. Merchants thus control the plentiful supply 
of resources, to which they apply labour supplied through immigration. In these 
circumstances merchants may have no need or incentive to revolutionize the 
means of production by introducing new technology. Merchants need only 
increase inputs of land and labour, so long as they are guaranteed control of 
output, and they will continue to appropriate the surplus. The result is an 
underdeveloped economy, wherein the transition to capitalism is arrested. 
Applying the model to Newfoundland, Antler argues that ownership of the 
means of production was difficult or impossible where the resource was not land 
but fish, a common property resource to which access was open. In the first half 
of the 19th century a diminishing number of British and local merchants 
captured control of output, not through ownership but by virtually eliminating 
the smallholders (the independent boat-owners and employers known as 
planters) through court decisions and control of imported supplies. The truck 
system followed: fishermen were bound to merchants by a system of debt and 
credit, fish became legal tender, and a cash economy virtually disappeared, at 
least in the fishery.30 The mode of production was pre-capitalist, since the unit of 
labour was the family, using not capital but tools — small boats, nets and lines. 
Labour productivity declined, but technological change and productivity 
growth were precluded by the social structure itself. Fishermen lacked the means 
to apply new technology, while merchants lacked the incentive because they 
could continue to accumulate surplus value by adding more indebted fishermen 
to their books and by manipulating the prices of imported goods and supplies. 
The result was a fishery denied access to its own surplus, and this meant a 
severely under-capitalized fishery well into the 20th century. The decline of 
Newfoundland's bank fishery, for instance, began in the year 1890, long before 
the return of large European fishing fleets to the banks. The exploitation of 
fishermen through this system had effects well beyond the fishery. Merchants 
had little incentive to re-invest earnings from the fishery into manufacturing 
(although a small industrial sector did appear), precisely because the efficient 
capture of surplus value had left a weak cash economy and a domestic market 
too weak to sustain a large manufacturing sector. Much of Newfoundland's 
earnings from the fishery were therefore exported from the colony. This net 
outflow of capital was not the result of the concentration of capital in Canada or 
elsewhere. It was the result of Newfoundland's class structure and the social 
30 But see also Rosemary Ommer, '"All the Fish of the Post': Resource Property Rights and 
Development in a Nineteenth Century Inshore Fishery", Acadiensis, IX, 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 
107-23. 
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relations of production in the marine sector, which generated an economic 
surplus but discouraged its reinvestment in Newfoundland. 
While historians, myself included, have quibbled with parts of Antler's thesis, 
there is no doubt that he has applied a powerful model to the history of an 
underdeveloped economy. In the history of the Maritimes the Marxist model 
exists, at least in the published literature, more often as a hypothesis than as a 
conclusion: "The pre-existing social relations of production in Maritime 
agriculture and primary production militated and continued to militate against 
successful capitalist development".31 The most subtle and thorough testing of 
this approach can be found in the monumental thesis of Ian McKay and in 
papers growing from that work.32 In studying the history of mining, McKay 
comes closer than any other scholar to an integration of dependency theory with 
Marxist analysis. For McKay, the rate and direction of capital accumulation in 
the Maritimes were externally conditioned, but this "dependence" was part of 
the transition from merchant capitalism to industrial capitalism in particular 
19th century colonies. Capitalism, and even manufacturing, did appear in the 
Maritimes, but these industrial enclaves did not give the region a sustaining 
dynamic of industrial growth. This was in large part because of the "disarticulated" 
nature of economic development in the Maritimes, beginning in the first half of 
the 19th century. By this McKay means that businesses in the region were not 
connected to each other in the same way as firms in a more closely integrated 
economy, but tended to buy their equipment and other capital goods from 
outside, so that the "multiplier effect" of new investment was transferred from 
the colony back to the mother country. The regional economy in the 19th century 
never became more than the sum of its constitutent parts, and merchant capital 
left a legacy of fragmentation which retarded the development of a "class 
dynamic" and impaired the eventual industrialization of the region. 
McKay's work is very close to the more powerful of recent post-dependency 
scholarship outside Canada. The passage quoted above echoes parts of the 
sophisticated "modes of production" analysis by Norman Long and Bryan 
Roberts in Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Development in the 
Central Highlands of Peru (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984), a 
book to be recommended to all historians interested in regionalism.33 But 
31 Clow, "Politics and Uneven Capitalist Development", p. 134. 
32 Ian McKay, "Industry, Work and Community in the Cumberland Coal Fields, 1848-1927"(Ph.D. 
thesis, Dalhousie University, 1983); "The Realm of Uncertainty: The Experience of Work in the 
Cumberland Coalfields, 1870-1930", Acadiensis, XVI, 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 3-57; "Class Politics and 
Regional Dependency: The Rise and Fall of the Working-Class Movement in the Coalfields of 
the Maritime Provinces, 1830-1930" (paper presented to the Symposium on Canadian-Welsh 
Labour History, Gregynog, April 1987). 
33 See Long and Roberts, Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Development in the 
Central Highlands of Peru (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 67-9. For a different sectoral approach see 
Benjamin S. Orlove, Alpacas, Sheep, and Men: The Wood Export Economy and Regional 
Society in Southern Peru (New York, 1977). 
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McKay is cautious, and his initial focus is that of the labour historian interested 
in finding an analytical framework to explain the rise and decline of a working 
class movement in a regional industry. He regrets that labour historians have not 
yet offered a general explanation of the development of the region using the 
concept of class.34 And he understands as well as anybody the limits of the same 
dependency theory to which he is indebted: "Dependency theorists, for their 
part, have never managed to explain in historical terms why it was that the 
unevenness of capitalist development should necessarily have operated to the 
disadvantage of the Maritimes".35 Even this most diligent student of dependency 
concludes by appealing to historians and sociologists to return to the archives, 
leaving the old "mechanical model of development" behind them, to search 
instead for the internal structures which preceded the retarded capitalist 
development of the 20th century. 
McKay's appeal is timely, not least because the neo-classical economic 
approach is also enjoying a remarkable revival. Regional historians and 
sociologists may not yet be aware of the extent to which Kris Inwood's work will 
force us to rethink the whole question of the historical conditions of 
underdevelopment in the Maritimes. One of the more persuasive empirical 
demonstrations of dependency was David Frank's essay on the fate of Nova 
Scotia's steel industry in the 1920s under the impact of external capital. Inwood 
offers an alternative explanation for the decline of Maritime steel, an 
explanation resting upon the marginal character of local resources and the 
industry's inability to take advantage of scale economies.36 Having quietly 
dismissed dependency theory for its want of empirical proof, Inwood proceeds 
to re-open the whole question of the productivity of regional industries in the 
19th century, and the possibility that relatively low per capita incomes from the 
regional resource industries may have inhibited long-term economic develop-
ment. Inwood's assumptions are precisely defined, and his impressive empirical 
base is rapidly expanding. This is not a return to simple staple determinism, but 
a cautiously penetrating dissection of all recent approaches which can only be 
answered by an equally vigorous reassembly of theory and evidence.37 
34 He notes, of course, the many essays of David Frank, which followed from "The Cape Breton 
Coal Miners, 1917-1926" (Ph.D. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1979); see Frank, "The Struggle 
for Development: Workers in Atlantic Canada in the Twentieth Century", in W.J.C. Cherwinski 
and Gregory S: Kealey, eds., Canadian Labour and Working Class History (St. John's, 1985), pp. 
135-47. 
35 McKay, "Class Politics and Regional Dependency", p. 47. 
36 David Frank, "The Cape Breton Coal Industry", in Frank, ed., Industrialization and 
Underdevelopment in the Maritimes, 1880-1930 (Toronto, 1985), pp. 55-86; Kris Inwood, "Local 
Control, Resources and the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company", Canadian Historical 
Association Historical Papers (1986), pp. 254-82. 
37 Kris Inwood and John Chamard, "Regional Industrial Growth during the 1890s: The Case of the 
Missing Artisans", Acadiensis, XVI, 1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 101-18; "Economic Growth and 
Structural Change in Atlantic Canada, 1850-1910", in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge Nordvik, eds., 
I 
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It may be that the internal preconditions for underdevelopment in the 
Maritimes included resource industries of low productivity, resource industries 
which permitted the easy substitution of labour for capital, and relatively low per 
capita incomes by comparison with central Canada. It may be that these things 
preceded Confederation, and influenced the location of manufacturing industry 
after Confederation, despite the impressive growth of particular industries in the 
Maritimes in the 1870s and 1880s. Certainly there is evidence to suggest that such 
factors may have inhibited industrial growth in the Maritimes in the last half of the 
19th century. At Confederation the industrial base in the Maritimes was smaller and 
different than that in central Canada. By comparison with Ontario, industry in the 
Maritimes was both smaller on a per capita basis and it was less capital intensive. 
Furthermore, it may be that the Maritime provinces specialized in industries having 
limited forward and backward linkages within the local economy. Almost half of 
industrial output in New Brunswick in 1870 was accounted for by sawmilling, ship 
materials, and shipyard output, whereas these industries accounted for only 11.5 
percent of output in Ontario.38 
Capital, Output and Labour in Canadian Manufacturing in 1870 
Province Capital Gross value Net value % of total 
invested of output added per Canadian 
per hands per worker worker gross 
employed output 
Ontario: 434 1,314 568 51.8% 
New Brunswick: 326(75%) 946(72%) 432(76%) 7.8% 
Nova Scotia: 387 (89%) 791 (60%) 419 (74%) 5.6% 
Quebec: 421(97%) 1,157(88%) 489(86%) 34.8% 
All figures are current dollars. Percentages in brackets are percentages of the 
Ontario figure. Data are from Canada, Census, 1871, vol. Ill, and Peter 
McClelland, "the New Brunswick Economy in the Nineteenth Century" 
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1966), Table LXIX, p. 255. 
Across the Broad Atlantic: Essays in Comparative Maritime History (Oslo, Norwegian 
University Press, forthcoming); John Chamard and Kris Inwood, "The Growth of Manufactur-
ing: Ontario and the Maritimes Compared" (paper presented to the Atlantic Canada Studies 
Conference, Halifax, 1985). 
38 Canada Census, 1871, vol. Ill, Table LV. 
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This argument is not intended to endorse either the current neo-classical 
revival or the earlier export-base approach of Peter McClelland. On the 
contrary, it is precisely at this point, in the face of such evidence, that Professor 
Inwood's theoretical tools may fail him. It remains an enduring and unresolved 
puzzle for the neo-classical economist that market adjustment mechanisms 
failed to reduce regional inequalities in the long run. If low productivity and low 
per capita incomes can be traced back to the third quarter of the 19th century, the 
mystery deepens. If incomes and productivity were low in the Maritimes, labour 
and capital should have moved to other regions and other industries, and the 
neo-classical economist can hardly blame state intervention and social security 
systems for interfering with the adjustment mechanisms more than a century 
ago. Given what we know of migration patterns, it is unlikely that there were 
massive cultural barriers to labour mobility among Maritimers. Given the fact 
that merchant capitalists in Halifax and Saint John bought and sold staples and 
shipping services in markets from London to New York and San Francisco, it is 
hardly likely that parochial horizons inhibited the movement of their capital or 
their ability to purchase extra-regional industrial stock. Besides, if it is proved 
that resource-based regional industries suffered from low productivity, and if 
this can no longer be blamed upon a weak resource base or the poor quality of 
fish as a generator of linkages, then what explains that low productivity? 
Faced with the same evidence, the post-dependency Marxist literature on 
underdevelopment offers new avenues of approach and perhaps even solutions. 
Imported capital established enclave industries, such as shipbuilding and 
mining, which not only eroded but sustained forms of pre-capitalist production. 
Many of the more technologically sophisticated inputs into such industries were 
imported from Britain and elsewhere, thereby limiting local industrial develop-
ment. To the extent that inputs were locally produced, they came from small 
craft producers whom the enclave industries thereby sustained. Merchant 
capital was not always a solvent of pre-capitalist production; it could instead 
give stability to low productivity agriculture and other non-wage subsistence 
sectors. It could do this in part because of the extensive practice of occupational 
pluralism. Lumbering and farming complemented and sustained each other as 
labour moved with the seasons from one economic activity to another. Farm 
labour contributed to the timber trade, while small cash earnings from 
lumbering, sawmilling, shipbuilding and other seasonal work allowed small 
farm units to remain viable. The shipping industry, a large part of the economy 
for much of the century, interacted with agriculture: to the extent that domestic 
demand for grain and other foodstuffs was met through imports carried in the 
large supply of inward tonnage, the incentive to apply new technology in 
agriculture was lacking. Farms remained small, compared to those in Ontario, 
and farmers used smaller inputs of capital and specialized in low value field 
crops, such as potatoes and hay, rather than wheat. Low productivity farms in 
turn provided cheap inputs (labour, foodstuffs, and sometimes materials) for 
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lumbering, sawmilling, and shipbuilding. The shipping industry, itself sustained 
by the export trade in timber, limited opportunities for local industrial 
development by allowing the import of manufactured goods at low freight costs. 
Relatively slow capitalist development was deeply rooted in the mutually 
sustaining interaction of sectors, and in the relationships between capitalist and 
pre-capitalist modes of production.39 
In this loosely integrated resource-based economy with its large transporta-
tion sector, merchant capital developed efficient methods of capturing economic 
surplus without restructuring production. Shipyards expanded in size but 
retained old handicraft techniques. Steam was applied to sawmilling but only in 
a limited way by 1850, and in 1860 only 60 of 689 sawmills in New Brunswick 
were using steam.40 The truck system was the form of payment for many in 
lumbering and fishing, and it helped merchants to secure control of output 
without exercising control over production. The social relations of production 
in fishing guaranteed merchant profits through increments of labour and 
modest inputs of gear and supplies; labour productivity declined but technologi-
cal change remained slow. The massive shipping industry, increasingly owned by 
merchants, facilitated mercantile control of prices and of savings. As in 
Newfoundland, an internal dynamic necessary to sustain the transformation to 
industrial capitalism was relatively weak. Despite the patterns of exchange and 
interaction between sectors, this was not a single, regionally integrated economy 
by the third quarter of the century, and local economic elites were not a class 
conscious bourgeoisie, but family firms and merchant entrepreneurs scattered 
through many communities and possessing differing commitments to regional 
and to industrial development. From these internal conditions followed the 
support of sections of the merchant class for a political and customs union with 
other colonies, and many were eager to forge the chains of regional interdepen-
39 While much of this is conjectural, there is already supporting evidence. On agriculture see Peter 
McClelland, "The New Brunswick Economy in the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard 
University, 1966), pp. 43-5; A.R. MacNeil, "A Reconsideration of the State of Agriculture in 
Eastern Nova Scotia, 1791-1861" (M. A. thesis, Queen's University, 1983); Rusty Bittermann, 
"Economic Stratification in a Cape Breton Agricultural Community in the Nineteenth Century: 
A Production/Consumption Approach" (winner of the David Alexander Essay Prize, 1985); 
Anthony Winson, "The Uneven Development of Canadian Agriculture: Farming in the 
Maritimes and Ontario", Canadian Journal of Sociology, X, 4 (Fall 1985), pp. 411-38. On 
connections between lumbering and farming see Graeme Wynn, Timber Colony: A Historical 
Geography of Early Nineteenth Century New Brunswick (Toronto, 1981). On Gross Value 
Added per worker in fishing and in agriculture see A.G. Green, Regional Aspects of Canada's 
Economic Growth (Toronto, 1971), Tables B-l and C-l, pp. 85, 104. Regional fragmentation is 
discussed in Graeme Wynn, "The Maritimes: The Geography of Fragmentation and Underdevel-
opment", in L.D. McCann, ed., Heartland and Hinterland: A Geography of Canada 
(Scarborough, 1982), pp. 156-213. On merchants and tariffs see T.W. Acheson, "The Great 
Merchant and Economic Development in St. John, 1820-1850", Acadiensis, VIII, 2 (Spring 
1979), pp. 3-27; T.W. Acheson, Saint John: The Making of a Colonial Urban Community 
(Toronto, 1985), chs. 3 and 10. 
40 Wynn, Timber Colony, p. 109; McClelland, "The New Brunswick Economy", p. 131. 
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dence. Thus the slow transition to industrial capitalism began not only with 
dependency, but in the interaction of production systems in the social formation 
of the Maritime provinces. 
These are not conclusions but suggestions, and they are hardly very original 
ideas, since Ian McKay and others are already working along these lines. As 
McKay and others have demonstrated, there are valuable lessons to be learned 
from models of development which have been applied elsewhere, and historians 
cannot afford to dismiss the theoretical work which sociologists and others 
bring to our attention. If the effort to apply models borrowed from Latin 
America and elsewhere sometimes fails, it is never so unrewarding as the 
gathering of data with no reference to theory at all. By guiding our reasoning 
from the particular to the general, theory tells us what we know. By making 
apparent that which it cannot explain, theory may guide us to the areas of 
historical experience which we must still explore. 
ERIC SAGER 
Volume VI of the D.C.B.: 
The 'last Survivor(s)' Revisited 
WITH THE PUBLICATION OF VOLUME VI of the Dictionary of Canadian Biogra-
phy (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1987), covering individuals who died 
in the 1821 to 1835 period, ten volumes have now appeared. Whether as 
contributors, reviewers or readers very few Canadian historians have escaped 
the grasp of this collective biographical project, although one must admit to 
meeting the occasional unrevised and unrepentant 20th century specialist who 
has not yet cracked its covers. Some academics have become so enamoured with 
the project that they faithfully serve as both contributors and reviewers of 
various volumes, a delightful example of self-serving impartiality. There might 
even be the occasional contributor who hoped his judgement that the "final 
result is a powerful indication that individual and collective biographical 
analysis remains one of the most valid instruments in the reconstruction and 
comprehension of the past" would remain buried in the pages of that once 
obscure journal Acadiensis.1 With this confession out of the way I welcome the 
opportunity to embark upon another assessment of the D.C.B., particularly 
since volume VI might be the last glimpse of the "last Survivor(s)" of the loyalist 
first generation in the Maritimes.2 The period from 1821 to 1835 represents the 
final years for a good number of the loyalists who arrived in New Brunswick and 
1 W.G. Godfrey, "Some Thoughts on the D. C.B. and Maritime Historiography", Acadiensis, VII, 2 
(Spring 1978), p. 115. 
2 I borrow this expression from Phillip Buckner's biography of Ward Chipman (p. 143). 
